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Abstract 
The paper analyses the effectiveness of law enforcement by regulatory agencies in Hungary. 
Empirical data were collected from such diverse fields as consumer rights protection, construction, 
road safety, labor regulation, etc. The data were analyzed using a simplified rational choice model, 
looking for evidence of whether administrative practices were effective in preventing rational actors 
from breaking the law. The analysis robustly proves the ineffectiveness of regulatory activity, as the 
breaking of laws may yield, in a conservative estimate, 10 to 100,000 times more income than the 
expected monetary value of the fine. In brief, the government of Hungary is generally unable to 
enforce its own laws. Though the paper makes use of data solely from Hungary, it aims to provide a 
methodology for measuring regulatory capacity more generally. 
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 1. The (social and research) problem 
It is a recurring finding of both local and international researchers, as well as various 
international organizations, that law enforcement or the implementation of legal decisions is 
insufficient in Hungary, and in post-communist states generally. Since the book “Implementation” 
was first published four decades ago (Pressman-Wildavsky 1984), researchers of the policy process 
have been/are increasingly aware of the fact that adopted policy decisions may greatly change 
during the implementation process. (Howlett-Ramesh 2003: 185-204, especially: 188-189) The 
systematic failure of implementation is a persistent weakness of public administration, both in 
Central and Eastern Europe generally (Dunn – Staronova – Puschkarev 2006) and in Hungary 
specifically (Hajnal 2005, Hajnal 2010).  
This paper addresses the implementation of policies relying on regulation as a policy 
instrument. More specifically, the paper aims at measuring the regulatory or law enforcement 
capacity that, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as the ability of regulatory agencies to deter 
potential law-breakers. Regulatory agencies are typically not empowered to make rules themselves 
in Hungary; they are responsible solely for overseeing compliance with laws enacted by the 
legislature or other executive actors (i.e. Cabinet decrees). These agencies play a pivotal role in 
enforcing legal rules in Hungary. (Hajnal 2012) Regulatory agencies can be found in the fields of 
consumer rights protection, food and drug safety, work safety, control over bank and insurance 
activities, environmental protection, and special control over various fields of business activities, 
like mining, gaming, wine production, transportation, and energy services. 
The activity of these agencies, such as issuing construction permits, controlling the 
construction of family homes, or determining whether a particular garden is kept in an acceptable 
way, extends not only to firms and other legal entities, but individual citizens as well. The state 
attorney‟s office and criminal courts are involved only if the penal code is breached. Most offenses, 
however, are handled by regulatory agencies, which determine and apply sanctions. The law 
enforcement activity of agencies (including certain departments of municipal offices as well) may 
involve on-the-spot inspections and other ways of monitoring the potential infringement of laws, as 
well as applying penalties, almost exclusively in the form of levying fines. In sum, these agencies 
play a dominant role in implementing regulatory policies.  
 
2. An overview of relevant literature  
The interest in taking feeble implementation in the region as a research topic occurred first 
within the framework of governmental, policy, and administrative capacity (e.g.: Nunberg 1999, 
Goetz – Wollmann 2001). Nunberg (1999: 241-242) notes that laws are frequently not 
implemented, whereas Dimitrova (2010) argues that informal rules could be more relevant than 
laws in administrative reality. Goetz (2001) draws on the similarities to Latin America, in that 
regard. 
The accession of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) to the EU has stimulated 
further interest in policy and related research. The problem of ineffective law enforcement, or – in 
policy terms – the “implementation gap” has been raised in reports prepared by the European Union 
on Hungary (EC 2003) and on countries of the region generally (EC 2002: especially p.55-56). 
OECD-SIGMA, as early as 1998, highlighted the great difference between adoption and 
implementation of EU laws in the region. Since accession, the implementation gap has not 
diminished. Discussing the field of labor laws (working time, equal treatment), governed mostly by 
regulatory agencies, Falkner-Trieb (2008) and Falkner et al. (2008) classify the implementation 
style of new member states as the “world of dead letters.” Dimitrova (2010) treats this 
implementation gap as a dependent variable (i.e. as a fact not needing to be proven) and seeks 
potential explanations for the phenomenon. Investigations of specific administrative fields have 
concluded similarly. For instance, an OECD report (2007) on environmental protection noted: “The 
implementation gap persists. The basic legal and policy frameworks are often in place and keep 
improving, even if further important reforms are still needed. The real problem is 
implementation…” (p.2) Batory (2012), writing in the field of anti-corruption laws, finds that 
“policy design problems are compounded by a very evident implementation problem.” (p. 67) 
Meyer-Sahling (2011) provides another good example from the field of civil service policy. In sum, 
dozens of studies argue that policy implementation in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries and in Hungary is weak generally, and particularly in terms of executing laws. 
Empirical analysis of implementation and implementation capacity in CEE countries is 
surprisingly scarce, and what exists is limited in both scope and methodology. (Trieb 2008; 
Sedelmayer 2011; Angelova et al. 2012) Most of the studies focus on the implementation of EU 
regulations within the theoretical framework of pre- and post-accession compliance, where 
“conditionality” is a key word referring to the ability of EU institutions to force national 
governments to adopt the acquis. Implementation occurs typically as “compliance”, which, in this 
context, refers to the EU–national government relations, and as such has not much to do with 
effective implementation of policies at the local level. (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009.) As Sedelmayer 
(2011: 26) notes: “Studies…focused most on formal rule adoption, i.e. the legal transposition of the 
acquis, but a key issue [would be]… practical implementation on the ground…”. Indeed, empirical 
analysis in this field is limited to a few studies, mostly of Gerda Falkner and her colleagues. 
Most of the empirical studies focus on specific policy fields, such as environment protection, 
anti-corruption, and antidiscrimination policies (see Krizsan 2009, and most articles in that journal 
volume). To that end, there exists a reasonable doubt about the generalizability of findings, as 
Falkner and Trieb (2008: 310) explicitly indicate.  
Somewhat surprisingly there are hardly any comprehensive empirical studies on 
implementation focusing specifically on national policies, irrespective of EU conditionality. The 
few studies that investigating effective, street-level implementation rely predominantly on expert 
interviews and the judgments of one or a few experts. Surprisingly, implementation studies that 
would utilize such self-evident information sources as agency databases and/or statistics can hardly 
be found. In fact, I could not find any publication that (i) addressed the question of “implementation 
gap” in several agencies or policy fields (ii) relying on the availability of administrative information 
(iii) in the CEE context generally or in a country. There are two main reasons why agency data are 
not used in this regard. First, agency statistics may not be available for research (or for the public) 
in a particular area. At the time of this research, the agency statistics which we were able to obtain 
existed only at some agencies and on select issues. (Though, when we wanted to repeat the research 
in 2012 we found that most of these agency statistics were not available anymore.) Second, the 
“standardizability” of data is questionable. How could we compare data from the work safety sector 
to that from highway patrol or construction control? The method suggested, applied and reviewed 
below makes standardized study of implementation in various policy fields possible. The aim of this 
paper, thus, is to propose and apply a method to measure the ability of regulatory agencies to 
effectively enforce laws. The proposed methodology allows for quantitatively measuring the 
agencies‟ potential for effective law enforcement. The method can be applied to diverse 
administrative fields and in various countries. Furthermore, the method may provide some 
explanation of the presumed incapacity.  
In the next section a simple model will be presented that allows the assessment of regulatory 
agencies‟ performance. It is argued that this model fits best to the task, even though it has some 
limitations, which are also discussed briefly. First the applied methodology than the findings of the 
research will be presented: Two specific cases will be reviewed in greater detail, and then overall 
findings in several fields will be presented in numeric format. Finally, the paper attempts to answer 
the two ultimate research questions: (i) Can law enforcement capacity, as defined above, be 
considered effective? and (ii) Is the proposed method appropriate to provide a general cross-
sectorial measure for question (i)? 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. The model applied 
The proposed model emanates from Law and Economics. Our starting point was the 
simplest approach to deterrence and/or sanctioning. Becker (1968), in his seminal work, laid down 
the economic model, which has been further discussed and elaborated by Stigler (1970) and Posner 
(1985) among others. However, several elements of these models were omitted from ours. In fact a 
simplistic rational choice model is offered here based on the presumption that social actors 
circumvent laws if it is worth it for them and would not do so if the expected penalty is higher than 
the benefit one expects to gain from breaking the rules. In other words, we compare the expected 
penalty, typically the monetary value of the fine, and the assessed monetary value of the potential 
gain from breaking the law. If the gain (G) is larger than the expected fine (E), then we hypothesize 
that a rational actor will break the law. The expected fine is calculated according to the Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function by multiplying the probability (P) that the fine is successfully levied 
with typical amount of fine (F).  
However, it is practically impossible to assess the probability of successful fining, since no 
data are available on this overly broad issue. On the other hand, several pieces of information are 
available regarding certain segments of regulatory activities. It seems necessary, and at the same 
time possible, to analytically break down the process into measurable stages. Frequently, data are 
available on the number of entities to be inspected and the number of actual inspections. For 
example, data in the field of consumer rights protection and work safety are fully available at 
regulatory agencies in Hungary. Based on an analysis of the administrative process, on one hand, 
and the availability of data, on the other, four segments were identified that may be described by 
four probability values, as follows: 
 Pi Probability of inspection taking place. (E.g. the inspector attends at the site and checks if the 
state or activity is appropriate: workers are not illegally employed, consumers are not cheated, 
the building was built according to the permit, etc.) This probability is calculated as [number of 
entities inspected] / [number of entities to be inspected]. The first figure is frequently available 
in form internal statistics of agencies; the latter can also be obtained from these statistics, or from 
the Central Statistical Office data (e.g. number of business sites, number of houses). 
 Pr Probability that the procedure reveals the infringement of law. (Opposite of latency. E.g. 
buildings built without a permit are discovered.) This probability is calculated as [number of 
infringements detected] / [number of total infringements]. Due to the nature of latency, data 
regarding this factor are rarely available, though there are exceptions (e.g. amount of non-taxed 
gasoline on the market, based on controlling pumps by another agency). Depending on the 
specificity of the inspection, data from fields Pi and Pr can be assessed only jointly (e.g., 
discovering buildings built without permit or a forest illegally cut).  
 Pf Probability that the infringement of law can be legally proven by the regulatory agency and 
the fine is levied on first instance. In a few cases, this data may be available from agency 
statistics as [number of decisions levying fines] / [number of minutes detecting infringement 
and/or legal process initiated]. In several cases the laws are so complicated, or the legal 
guaranties for the clients are formulated in such a way, that proving infringement is almost 
impossible. For example, if the municipal guard takes a picture of a person on a track shoveling 
rubble in a park, this may not be enough to prove illegal behavior, as the person might argue that 
he was collecting the rubble and not discarding it. As another illustration, a forest guard may not 
stop a truck full of freshly cut logs as the driver is not obliged to declare where the wood is from.  
 Pp Probability that the fine is paid by the punished entity. Quite frequently, even if fine has been 
levied it is not paid. Business organizations may simply close (i.e. disappear as legal entities) and 
be opened under another name on the same day; alternatively, they may have never legally 
existed or their owners might turn out to be unidentifiable. Persons may have no official income 
(e.g. work on the black market) and have no any property. The value of Pp is calculated as [fine 
paid] / [total amount of fines levied], typically on an annual basis. These data may be available 
from annual agency reports or from the agencies‟ finance departments.  
These four steps must all be successful (conjunctive conditions) to assure successful fining. 
These probabilities are so-called “independent probabilities”; thus, we may speak of “conditional 
independence” in mathematical terms. One can calculate the probability of successful fining (P) by 
multiplying these partial probabilities. Formulating these statements into simple mathematical form, 
one may state that regulatory agencies can effectively enforce regulations (appropriate regulatory 
capacity) only if:  
G < E 
that is 
G < P * F 
that is 
G < (Pi * Pr * Pf  * Pp) * F  
 
Breaking the ultimate probability into partial probabilities allows us to obtain data on 
practical frequencies from official data on which at least some of these probabilities can be reliably 
assessed. This model also allows us to handle an assumed lack of information, as partial 
probabilities for which information is unavailable are assessed as 1,0. Since the value of probability 
– as a mathematical measure – can be between zero and one, where 0 means “impossible” and 1,0 
means “sure”, if a partial probability assessed as 1, it means we presume that regulation functions 
perfectly in that regard. This leads to a conservative estimation, which evaluates regulatory activity 
as surely more successful (i.e. “perfect”) than it can be in reality. As it was typically possible to 
appropriately assess only 1-3 (out of 4) partial probabilities, whereas others, due to the lack of 
reliable data, were calculated as 1, the effectiveness ratio was largely, though intentionally, 
overestimated. In some cases, this conservative assessment of E could be hundreds or even 
thousands of times higher than the maximum likelihood estimated by experts.  
 
3.2. Strengths and weaknesses of the model  
From an academic point of view, this model (a) in fact operationalizes the research question 
by allowing the assessment of probabilities on available data and (b) also allows us to handle the 
situation in a systematic manner if such data are not available. From a practical-policy point of 
view, (c) the model, besides providing summative evaluation data, may also serve with formative 
evaluation information, i.e. it could assist decision-makers in finding weak points of regulatory 
activities, in order to increase effectiveness (e.g. the number of on the spot checks should be 
increased). Finally (d), the model allows us to establish a general picture, drawn from various 
inspection fields, on the effectiveness of regulatory agencies and generally the government’s ability 
to enforce laws or its systematic flaws in that regard. (In this paper we do not touch upon practical 
results (point c) of the research.) 
The potential weaknesses of the model may be classified into three main types: (i) Some, 
most likely scholars in the law & economics field, may condemn the oversimplified nature of the 
model. (ii) Others, most likely scholars of public administration and compliance theory, may 
criticize the rational choice approach as unrealistic and neglecting most of the relevant motivating 
factors. (iii) Still others may call attention to the technical deficiencies of collecting and 
interpreting data. Furthermore, the proposed approach is somewhat unfashionable and indeed 
simplistic vis-à-vis the neo-institutionalist or discourse analysis methods that are more widely used 
nowadays. However, the classical economic-rational model, precisely because of its tendency to 
simplify complex social realities, may provide a method that can be utilized in various 
administrative (or social) fields and in various countries. Whereas a neo-institutional approach can 
provide a more accurate description of a specific field, its potential for comparison is highly limited. 
(Dugger 1994) Thus, for the purpose of this research the rational model seems more suitable. In the 
following paragraphs these critical points will be briefly overviewed.  
(i). This model omits several economic formulas, such as those about the optimal level of 
enforcing laws, the marginal level of penalty and the “equilibrium” approach more generally. These 
elements were irrelevant to this research, as the question refers not to economic efficiency of law 
enforcement but to the effectiveness (level of goal-attainment) of regulatory activity. Furthermore, 
we focus on “typical” cases, in sharp contrast to economics, which includes each and every actor, as 
their preferences, performances, utilities, and so on provide the basis for those functions that are the 
foundation of economic theory. The present model is instead targeted toward the typical. 
Consequently, it may not be true for every actor. For example, even if the enforcement 
capacity in a particular regulatory scheme is low, there may be some who would be still deterred. 
Further critics may attack the model as it does not take into consideration the actors‟ attitudes 
toward risk (risk-seeking – neutral – risk-averse), though there are well-known methods to handle 
this issue. Most importantly, one may reasonably argue that it is not the real enforcement capacity 
but rather the perceived capacity that determines people‟s behavior. The latter, however, may be 
influenced or even determined by several other factors, such as the media. Whereas this argument 
may be true, the author argues that if incapacity is so self-evident, as it is in the case of Hungary, 
this information may be known by most of the interested parties. 
Most of the above considerations – and several others not discussed here – could have been 
built into the model. However, the more precise it is, the more complex a model becomes. In this 
early stage of the study, simplicity was crucial.  
(ii) The model cannot handle several real-life situations well. Regulations are frequently 
followed for moral reasons, either because one agrees with the overall purpose of the rule, even 
against his/her own interest, or because he/she agrees that rules should generally be followed. On 
the other hand, regulations cannot be followed, if people are not aware of them. Furthermore, 
customs and strong emotions frequently mitigate people‟s rational calculations and thus make 
penalties futile. An answer to these critiques could be that the cases that cannot be analyzed by the 
model in theory cannot be handled by the modern law in reality either. As Max Weber argues, 
modern, that is formal (as opposed to material), law is designed for rational actors who calculate 
gains and losses caused by their action in advance. (Weber 1947: 219-221; Weber 1958: 25) 
Scholz (1997) demonstrates that the economic model, even in its more complex form than 
the one used here, is based on four basic assumptions, all of which can be considered as 
oversimplifications. These assumptions do not correspond well with empirical evidence, as the 
reality is much more complex. Kagan (1994) lists and structures well over a dozen factors that 
influence enforcement and compliance. Tyler (1990), in his seminal work, argues that it is not the 
fear of penalty but such elements as trust, legitimacy and the perception of justice (most of all, 
procedural justice) that are crucial to obeying the law. These and several other analyses, again, call 
attention to the oversimplified nature of the rational model. Naturally there is a tradeoff between the 
feasibility of cross-sectorial research and the sophistication of the research model. At this stage, the 
former seemed more important. 
Regulatory agencies‟ practice seems to diverge from strict enforcement based on close 
surveillance and penalty, towards more cooperative methods of information-negotiation-persuasion 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. These methods could be more effective than the classical punishment-
approach. (Amodu 2008) The model suggested here is based on the classical, strict law enforcement 
theory. In fact, all stakeholders, lawmakers, agency managers and inspectors, as well as the general 
public, expect this kind of approach from agencies. The cooperative approach would probably be 
negatively regarded in Hungarian society, most likely interpreted as a sign of corruption. (Keller-
Sik 2009)  
(iii) In some cases, levying fines is not the only penalty an agency may apply. Other options 
could be closing down the unit (e.g. restaurant, the plant) or demolishing the illegally-built 
structure, for example. Sometimes even initiating a criminal case is possible. These possibilities are 
not included in this model. Additional efforts were made to identify these different types of 
penalties and to assess their deterring impact. We found that other types of penalties play minimal 
roles: Regulatory agencies hardly ever utilize other options, as levying fines is the simplest method 
for them, and they are seemingly not interested if fines are paid or not. Furthermore, if other 
penalties (e.g. demolition) are not accomplished voluntarily by the wrongdoers, these decisions are 
“enforced” by levying so called procedural fines. In brief, other types of administrative penalties 
are hardly ever used in administrative practice. 
It may also be difficult to monetize gains. For instance, it is not easy and is perhaps even 
useless to determine the utility of not fastening seat belt or speeding on the highway. Even if it 
would be possible to measure this, relying on some techniques offered by the cost-benefit analysis, 
to do so would over-exhaust the potential of the model. In brief, if either the gains of infringing 
laws (G) or the expected penalty (E) cannot be expressed relatively easily in monetary terms, the 
model may be inadequate. However, we argue that in most cases the gain may be assessed relatively 
easily. 
An alternative approach could be measuring indicators of lawful behavior. However, reliable 
data is rarely available on this phenomenon and even if they are, it may not be an appropriate 
measure for gauging law enforcement activity. This is a crucial problem of policy analysis and 
program evaluation. (Mohr 1995: Ch. 1). Pollen concentration, for instance, may drop not because 
landowners were effectively forced to keep their territory in the right condition but because the 
weather was not good for weed growth. Most importantly, people may follow certain rules for 
moral reasons, or as a customary behavior, irrespective of any government activity, whereas the 
ultimate question of this study refers to the ability of regulatory agencies to deter those who 
otherwise would break the laws. In sum, the proportion of infringement of law itself, even if that 
would be measurable, would not be a good indicator of the effectiveness of regulatory activities. 
However, it could be a good indicator of overall compliance.  
 
3.3. Data collection 
The research took place from 2005-2007. Data refer to this period. The author planned to 
repeat the research five years later to obtain comparable data, but most of the agency statistics 
turned out to be unavailable by this time.  
We launched inquiry into about 20 regulatory fields, most of which are reviewed in Table 3. 
Some fields were dropped as no data were available or no appropriate field researcher was found.  
An attempt was made to apply the model on the most heterogeneous fields of inspection. 
Still, fields that were too large and complex to handle (most of all the tax authority‟s activities), as 
well as agencies that handle only one or a few large companies (like in the energy sector, nuclear 
site control, and railways) were omitted. 
Selection of cases depended on the availability of field experts; thus, it was done largely 
randomly, though not according to a purely random probability selection method. Field experts 
(typically civil servants of second-tier regional or central offices of agencies) were contracted to 
collect the available data for the model from agency statistics and databases. Some additional, 
relevant data, such as those on personal and technical capacity, as well as qualitative information on 
organizational and management structures and practices; legal and cultural environment; practical 
difficulties in carrying out investigations effectively, typical tricks of clients were also collected and 
compiled in 15-80 page case studies.  
Additionally, relevant newspaper articles of the leading Hungarian weekly publication HVG 
were also reviewed. Potential gains from infringing laws (G) were assessed according to common 
sense based on typical cases, some of which are reviewed below. 
 
4. Findings 
In this section, first the findings of two case studies will be briefly summarized in order to 
provide the reader with an impression on how the model was applied. Then an overview of 
quantitative results for most of the fields will be provided in Table 3. 
Data presented in this paper are from the author‟s book (Gajduschek 2008) that provides in-
depth analysis of a dozen case studies and more detailed data and explanation on several others, 
however in Hungarian.  
4.1. Undeclared employment. 
Undeclared employment refers to a person being employed in the gray market; neither 
personal income tax, nor social security for health and pension insurance are paid by the employer 
and the employee. The two parties are typically jointly interested in hiding the arrangement from 
the authorities. About one million people, one-tenth of Hungary‟s total population, may be 
employed in this way. Investigating cases of undeclared employment falls mainly to the Hungarian 
Labor Inspectorate. The Labor Inspectorate follows a so called risk assessment method, which in 
practice means that inspectors know that undeclared employment is typical in restaurants, pubs and 
on large construction works, where practically almost everyone is employed illegally. Thus, they 
visit mostly these sites. Quantitative findings are given in Table 1.  
Table 1. Calculation for expected fine (E) for undeclared employment (per person) 
 Value Explanation 
Pi   0.0198 25,740 on the spot visits (agency data) / 1,300.000 (number of business units – data from 
Statistical Office). 
Pr   1.0 In several cases, illegal workers just run (or, more likely, walk) away, as inspectors do not 
have the right to physically stop them, and police assistance is hardly ever utilized. 
Employers use various tricks to avoid being penalized. As no reliable quantitative data 
(hereinafter: NA) is available, due to the general design of the study, a conservative 
assessment is provided. (Considering this step of activity as perfect.) 
Pf  0.9395 In some cases, even if one has been caught “red-handed”, there are legal and other tricks that 
make possible to avoid penalties. According to agency statistics, the ratio is: 11,655 (penalty 
levied on first instance) / 12,405 (levying penalty initiated). (Agency data)  
Pp 0.599 Somewhat exceptionally, this agency has reliable data on collecting fines. Out of the 5.008 
billion HUF fine levied, they were able to collect 3 billion HUF; that is a good rate compared 
to previous years and to other agencies. (HUF: Hungarian forints. Calculations provided in 
this paper in EURO terms are based on 1 € = 270 HUF exchange rate.) 
F 440.11 € The value of the fine levied per person for not declaring employment is calculated from 
agency statistics, as they provide data on the number of cases and persons involved in cases, 
as well as on the total fine levied annually.  
E 4.90 € * The expected fine is: 0.0198 * 1.0 * 0.9395 * 0.5990 * €440.11; that is about 5 Euros.  
 
The expected fine is roughly equivalent to tax and social security payment for one day for 
someone with an average wage. Taking into consideration the amount of the fine levied (F), even if 
the authority repeats its activity at a site every three months, it may still be worth following this 
illegal practice.  
4.2. Illegal waste disposal 
Illegal waste disposal is almost an everyday practice for some citizens and entrepreneurs. 
Handling the problem falls under municipal jurisdiction. The findings presented in Table 2 are 
based on data from a small district of Budapest. 
 
Table 2. Calculation for expected fine (E) for illegal waste disposal (per case, cca. 2 m
3
) 
 Value Explanation 
Pi   1.0 Pi and Pr cannot be separated in this type of inspection. They are indicated below. 
Pr   0.0058 29 / 5011 The municipality collected 10230 m
3
 waste (typically building rubble) from parks and 
other public territories in 2006. Let‟s suppose that in each case 2 m3 waste is discarded. If so, 
there were 5,011 cases. The municipality initiated 29 legal cases.  
Pf  0.1034 The municipality levied fines in three cases. In other cases they could not prove that the accused 
person disposed the waste.  
Pp 1.0 NA. In spite of all efforts it was impossible to get information whether those three fines were 
paid.  
F € 24.69 Altogether 74.07 € in fines was levied for the three cases. 
E € 0.015 1,0 * 0,0058 * 0,1034 * 1,0 *  € 24.69 = 0,0006 * € 24.69 The expected fine is slightly more 
than one Eurocent! 
 
Building rubble should be discarded into special containers. A container costs about 48 €, 
which is twice as much as the fine levied on successful cases.  
4.3. Further cases and the overall picture 
The Hungarian weekly publication HVG publicizes some more severe cases than those 
mentioned above. For instance, during the 1990s, a black market of non-taxed gasoline emerged. 
Gasoline arrived to Hungary as lubricating oil or other substance that was taxed at much lower 
rates. Thousands of carts of oil were imported in this way. Customs officers were either bribed or 
various tricks were applied. The maximum fine set by law was about $130 at the time, and that was 
raised to $650 in 1993, whereas each cart yielded about $6,670. (EURO did not exist at this time. 1 
USD is calculated as HUF 75 for this period.) Less than 0.1% of these carts were found by customs 
officers. In most cases, fines were not levied or not paid, as the real owners were unidentifiable, or 
ceased to exist as companies. In this case, we can make a conservative assessment for the E / G 
ratio being about 100,000, that is the gain from infringement of the regulation is at least one 
hundred thousand times higher than the expected fine. Although these illegal activities were well 
known, even to the general public, authorities initiated only a few criminal cases for tax evasion but 
no one has ever been sentenced.  
In Table 3 we sum up the findings of the research, reporting the quantitative results of case 
studies on various fields of inspection. As discussed above, the total P value reflects the probability 
that the fine is effectively levied and collected (Pi*Pr*Pf*Pp) and F is the average value of fines 
given in Euros. E is the expected value of the fine that reveals how much on average one should 
expect for an infringement of a regulation in the given field. The G / E column can be considered as 
the final results of the research. It is based on the comparison of the expected fine against the 
potential gains that stem from circumventing the laws. This latter value is assessed according to 
common sense knowledge, taking into consideration various real-life cases. In certain fields the 
variance in this regard could be great, but taking into consideration the robust findings for G / E 
values, it might hardly influence the final conclusion.  
We relied on a conservative estimation for the G / E value; that is, we estimated inspection 
effectiveness as typically much better, and surely never worse, than it may be in reality. The last 
column of the table (MLE) provides a maximum likelihood estimate of the G / E value. Below we 
briefly describe the regulatory fields presented in the table.  
Table 3. Summary of some quantitative research findings  
 P F (€) E (€) G / E M.L.E. 
Specialized regulatory agency jurisdiction 
Consumer rights protection 0.1064 432.6 46.2 10 10 
Illegal construction 0.1224   50 100 
Undeclared employment  0.0113 440.1 4.9 1,360 2,720 
Illegal cutting of forest [missing word] 0.0030 5915.6 15.4 602 60,200 
Municipal jurisdiction 
Inappropriate running of business site 0.0643 75.2 4.8 78 234 
Not keeping land free of weeds 0.0490 124.9 6.1 4 80 
Illegal waste disposal (small amount) 0.0006 24.7 0.015 3,250 6,500 
Illegal advertisement on walls etc.  0.0037 111.1 0.45 10 1,000 
No “rational” G can be determined 
Speeding (police jurisdiction) 0.0333 133.3 4.4     
Leaving dog manure on street 0.9300 111.1 0.037     
No effective regulatory activity 
Driving over determined time-period    0 ∞ ∞ 
Illegally overweight trucks   0 ∞ ∞ 
Cases presented by investigative reporting of weekly HVG 
Fraud involving gasoline    100,000  10,000,000 
Fraud involving wine     1,000 100,000 
Illegal mining activity    23 300 
Explanatory notes to the items in the table: 
Consumer rights protection covers a wide range of areas. Some of them were individually assessed. The data in 
this table provides an overall picture of this field.  
Illegal construction work occurs if construction is carried out without an ex-ante permit. Houses of a certain 
style or size are prohibited generally or in some areas of a settlement. Buildings constructed without a permit may be 
demolished, though this has hardly ever happened. (In 2005, according to the agency statistics, the agency found that its 
decisions were not followed in 3506 cases. However only in 123 cases they initiated the demolition of illegally built 
building, and, as the field expert assesses the overwhelming majority of these decisions was not carried out in practice.) 
There are various tricks to avoid paying fines as well.  
Undeclared employment was reviewed in detail above.  
The illegal cutting of forests refers to the felling of trees without the permit from the relevant authority. 
Forestry regulations are rarely enforced. It is almost impossible the catch someone in the act, as there are not enough 
forest guards, and establishing proof is difficult. Even if a fine is levied, it is rarely paid, as those who actually cut the 
wood are typically without official income and property, and those who order the job are almost never caught.  
The inappropriate running of a business site consists of a wide range of issues that are combined into one item 
here. Municipalities inspect the business sites (e.g. shops, restaurants, factories), if they diverge from permitted 
activities (e.g. the car repairman collects and stores such dangerous car parts as batteries). Municipalities frequently 
seem to be especially incapable of enforcing regulations, partly because they do not have qualified personnel for this 
activity, and partly because they are reluctant to penalize citizens, who would later be voting for council members. This 
is the case in all regulatory activities of municipalities. 
Laws in Hungary require landowners to keep their land (yard or agricultural territory) in order. Most 
importantly, landowners are obliged to assure that no weed whose seeds may infect other pieces of land grows in large 
quantity. Particularly weeds whose pollen is allergenic must be kept under control. However, this field of inspection 
also belongs to municipalities with the above-mentioned shortcomings. (The pollen concentration has not been 
decreasing for more than a decade, despite several government “campaigns” against ragweed.) 
Illegal waste disposal was reviewed in detail above. 
Illegally posted advertisements cover the buildings and tram and bus stations, of major Hungarian cities. Only 
individuals caught in the act of posting can be penalized, however; never those whom they work for. The fine is low and 
rarely levied; if it is levied, it is rarely paid.  
Speeding has been a widely discussed issue as it resulted in death of hundreds of people over the years. 
Persons who were speeding must first have been measured with a specific, officially-calibrated instrument and then 
caught on the road. The technical and personnel capacity of the police were not enough to carry out this adequately and 
ways existed to avoid receiving a penalty. The rules were changed only in 2008, after almost two decades. As fining has 
become more successful the number of lethal accidents has declined enormously. 
On-the-spot fines supposed to be levied on those who do not pick up after their dogs. Still, the streets are full of 
dog waste, as police and local government guards are seemingly unable or unwilling to enforce this rule.  
Truck drivers are obliged to take a rest after a certain amount of driving time in order to avoid accidents caused 
by exhaustion. However, authorities lack the personnel for on-the-spot control. Furthermore, the Cabinet decree 
regulating procedural details was not issued for several years, thus jeopardizing effective inspection.  
Illegally overweight trucks (e.g. a truck calibrated to carry 5 tons is packed with 6.5 tons of material) cause 
severe harm to roads whose reconstruction then costs taxpayers millions of Euros annually. There is no personnel 
capacity and, even more so, no technology available to identify and prove this misconduct, however. For a long time, 
there was only one mobile scale in the whole country. 
The last three items in the table are based on investigative reports from the weekly publication HVG. Fraud 
with gasoline was discussed in detail above. Fraud with wine refers to cases when wine is made in illegal ways, most 
typically from chemical substances. The customs authority, police, food administration and agricultural inspectorate all 
have authority in this field; still, all seem to fail to enforce regulations, as in the nineties it was assessed by experts that 
more than half of the wine sold in Hungary was fake. Meanwhile hardly anyone was penalized for counterfeiting wine.  
Illegal mining is typically related to road constriction, when the company mines the necessary material (most 
of all gravel) at the nearest possible place without the necessary permit, leaving large craters behind). Though the 
beneficiary of this illegal activity is clearly identifiable, due to the stringent burden of proof requirements practically no 
one has ever been penalized. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The goal of the paper was to address questions regarding the law enforcement capacity of 
various Hungarian regulatory agencies. Furthermore, the paper aimed to test an instrument that may 
quantitatively answer this question and could be utilized in other context.  
5.1. Appropriateness and relevance of the method 
The paper introduced a model and its application that, in the author‟s view, is appropriate to 
measure enforcement capacity. The model allows for quantitatively assessing the law enforcement 
capacity of regulatory agencies based on statistical data of these agencies and other available 
statistics. 
Furthermore, the method also allows the researcher to draw a general picture of regulatory 
capacity in a given country by utilizing the available data in the same, standardized way. As far as 
the author knows, this is the only research in the CEE region that provides a cross-sectorial analysis 
on regulatory capacity based on quantitative data obtained from agency statistics. The author 
believes that this model offers an appropriate method to provide an overall regulatory capacity 
assessment in other countries as well. It would be especially useful to compare some countries of 
the CEE region to countries where the compliance ratio is relatively high. 
5.2. Interpreting the findings 
The starting point of the model is that regulatory agencies can effectively frighten away 
rational perpetrators and are able to enforce regulation only if the expected fine (E) for breaking the 
regulations is higher than the gain (G) that it yields, which in a simple mathematical inequality can 
be presented as: G / E < 1. As it can be clearly seen from the last two columns of Table 3, this 
condition is not fulfilled in any of the fields. On the contrary, depending on the case, G is ten to one 
million times higher than E. By using the applied model, it has been quantitatively proven that 
regulatory agencies systematically fail to enforce regulations. In fact, agency activity in its present 
form rather stimulates delinquency by rational actors.  
5.3. Further considerations: Laws, regulatory capacity and social morals in CEE 
In the past two decades, both the theory (Tyler 1990, 2006; Tyler-Darley 1999; Scholz, 
1997; Kagan 1994) and the practice (Scholz 1991; May-Burby1998; Amodu 2008) tend to refuse 
the classical enforcement strategy based on a rational choice model and its associated deterrence 
strategy. Kagan et al. (2011), however, in their recently published book, warn about the limits of the 
impact of moral factors in a competitive market environment (p. 49-52). They also emphasize the 
importance of classical enforcement, which “is important, first of all, in communicating regulatory 
norms and threatening credible levels of monitoring and legal sanctions for noncompliance; second, 
for its reminder effect („check your speedometer!‟); and third, for its reassurance effect („you are 
not a fool to comply; we are really looking for and finding the bad apples.‟)” (p.52).  
Hungarian regulatory agencies are unable to send these messages out to the society. 
Incapable regulatory agencies meet a seriously anomic society (Giczi-Sik 2009) with extremely low 
levels of trust (Mishler-Rose 1997) and cooperation among the civil society. (See also: Lengyel-
Vicsek 2005, and several papers in Kornai-Ackerman 2004.) The perception that regulatory 
agencies systematically fail to enforce laws spreads over time in the society, exacerbating 
noncompliance and inducing a vicious circle where high level of noncompliance meets regulatory 
incapacity that exacerbates noncompliance, and so on. In the end, those following rules may be 
considered as „losers‟, and breaking norms may become a norm itself. (Gajduschek 2008: 209-211; 
Sajó 2008) 
It seems practically impossible for agencies to prove that an individual has discarded rubble 
in a park, or has cut square miles of forest illegally, or has driven his car 70 miles/hour in a city. 
Similarly, in order to have an illegally built house demolished, the inspector needs to follow the 
roughly four thousand words long “checklist guide”, some requirements of which are practically 
impossible; thus, hardly any illegally built buildings have been demolished as agency statistics 
demonstrate.  
Regulatory agencies created in the transition from an authoritarian system lacked the 
requisite experience, personnel, and technical and financial resources to function appropriately in a 
Rule of Law environment. Extreme legal guarantees, created in 1990 as an overreaction to the legal 
practices of the past authoritarian regime may exacerbate the incapability of these agencies.  
Speeding may be a good positive example. For a long time, one could easily evade sanction 
with simple legal trickery based on some extreme legal guaranties to the perpetrators that made 
detection and sanctioning practically impossible. Once this legal anomaly was abolished in 2008, 
the prevalence of speeding and lethal accidents dramatically decreased. While the number of lethal 
accidents basically remained constant between 2001 (1,239) and 2007 (1,232), it dropped to 996 in 
2008. Then, as human and technical capacity for monitoring increased, it dropped further to 739 in 
2010. (Accident statistics, 2014) This seems to indicate that the classical law enforcement method 
with appropriate regulatory capacity can be effective and it may indeed change social behavior 
while potentially increasing trust in government authorities and forming a habit to drive with 
appropriate speed.  
A strict deterrence strategy by regulatory agencies, in certain situations may be useful. This 
strategy may increase citizens‟ trust, the image of procedural fairness and it may form missing 
customs or probably even morals in the society. It may also be a way to stop the vicious circle 
described above. This may be the case in Hungary and potentially in other CEE countries.  
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